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I. Introduction
In April, 1806, nearly four hundred nobles met in a session of the Közép-Szolnok
county assembly in Northern Transylvania. The speaker before them came from a
prestigious family whose ancestors had addressed that body for two centuries.
None of this was unusual. What was extraordinary was that the speaker was nine
years old. In his youthful voice, he announced to them his intention to become a
patriot:
Fathers and Patriots! ...
I already feel such a love for my country and to you. Fathers! I also
want to be a patriot. You work with a noble fire. And why? So that
you may bring us happiness.
Oh, fathers, please believe that my spirit is so ready to follow in
your footsteps. But my nine-year-old body is my obstacle. I am not
like Alexander the Great who envied his fathers achievements. There
is enough work for all of us to do. But what sort of work? We will
raise the pillars skyward for you. And what you do not finish, we
shall complete with your same noble fire ...
... Keep your eyes on me. And do not forget that today I have
dedicated myself to become a patriot. In just a short time you will see
that I have not disappointed your expectations of me.1
The lad was Miklós Wesselényi who, faithful to his promise, became a leader in
the Hungarian Reform Movement from 1830 to 1849. At times his dreams for
renascent Hungary seemed so bright with promise. But the patriots path was also
strewn with disappointments, treason trials, imprisonment, blindness and an early
civic death.
There was also the conflict between the nations Magyars and its nationalities.
Wesselényi saw the ethnic battle lines forming much earlier than did most Hun-
garians. He was partly a sage, partly a product of his time. In hindsight some of his
proposals seem naïve today and a number of his ideas were ill-timed because of
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domestic or external political conditions. His analysis of a problem was some-
times sharper than his solution. But in a time of rising ethnic nationalism, he tried
to find a common ground on which Magyars and non-Magyars could meet in
order to avert what may have been an inescapable clash. He saw that unless the
nationality divisions and conflicts were resolved, they would be exploited to
weaken, or perhaps destroy, the Hungary he knew.
Wesselényi has not been ignored by historians of Reform Age Hungary, but his
role has been overshadowed. His time of greatest political influence (183035)
was wedged between the meteoric rise of his early friend, István Széchenyi, be-
fore him and the towering later figures of Lajos Kossuth in 184849 and Ferenc
Deák in 186768. Wesselényis modern biographer, Zsolt Trócsányi, calls him
the Father of Hungarian Liberalism.2  But more important than his title is the
answer to the question: Was Wesselényi so important to Hungarys Reform Age
that the period cannot be truly understood without knowing of his role in it?
Were this question asked about Deák, Széchenyi or Kossuth, the answer would
clearly be in the affirmative. A case can be made that Wesselényi also should
belong to that select group.
One Wesselényi biographer divides his public life into two periods, one basi-
cally encompassing the 1830 years, the other the 1840s. During the first, Wesselényi
drafted his reform program, much of which is found in Balítéletekrõl (About Preju-
dices). In the second, he addressed nationality issues in his Szózat a magyar és
szláv nemzetiség ügyében (An Appeal in the Hungarian and Slav Nationality Mat-
ter).3  This bifurcation of his public life provides a useful yardstick, but may be a
little incomplete. Reform legislation and the nationality question were not iso-
lated, but related and intertwined, events. Enactment of Wesselényis program
was complicated by the demographic reality that more than fifty per cent of the
Hungarian population was non-Magyar.4  The nationality issue was an obstacle to
the passage of reform legislation in a nation led by a feudal Magyar ruling elite.
Yet Szózats plan to pacify the non-Magyars was to offer them the very constitu-
tional rights Balítéletekrõl had already outlined a decade earlier.
Another problem with the two-part analysis is its assumption that Wesselényi
retained his Szózat views until he died in 1850. More recent scholars claim that in
1848, Wesselényi modified some of his Szózat views regarding the Romanians
and the South Slavs. These writers suggest that after 1848, Wesselényi doubted
whether such groups would remain in Hungary and proposed the nation should go
forward without them.5
Rather than compartmentalize Wesselényis public life into just the two peri-
ods, a more complete analysis of his nationality ideas might consider:
1) the pre-1830 formative years during which he shaped a rough vision of a
Hungarian and Transylvanian political renaissance;
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2) the 183038 period highlighted by his confidence in liberalism, land re-
forms and constitutionalism all of which he believed would modernize Hungary;6
3) the 184047 years dominated by the nationality issue; and finally,
4) the 184849 Revolution years in which he became at least partly disillu-
sioned with some of his earlier assumptions and concluded that a number of the
nationality groups were unlikely to remain as part of the Hungarian nation.
The leitmotif of Wesselényis public life was the need for a Hungarian national
revival. But three important sub-themes were interwoven within that dominant
idea: hope characterized the 183036 years; angst colored 184047, and resigna-
tion to reality settled over him during his last years. Seen together these three
themes offer a kind of kaleidoscope which may help us better understand him.
II. Prelude and Preparation
Baron Miklós Wesselényi (the younger) was born on December 30, 1796 in the
family castle at Zsibó, Közép-Szolnok county, Transylvania. The Wesselényi family
had been prominent in Transylvania for centuries, although often controversial
and not always kaisertreu. Wesselényis father (also named Miklós) was an in-
triguing figure who was influenced by both the Enlightenment and Magyar na-
tionalism. Zsigmond Kemény wrote of him that he was a restless soul like a
stormy petrel, who yearned for the storm and for excitement which he endeavored
to satisfy with every breath.7  In 1792, Transylvanias Diet met to consider the
Supplex libellus Valachorum, which proposed that the regions Romanians be
treated as a nation equal to the three historic national groups. Midway through the
reading of Supplex a fire bell rang outside causing many delegates to rush from
their seats to see what was burning. Amid all this turmoil, the elder Wesselényi
climbed on his desk and called on the delegates to return as there was already fire
enough to put out within their own hall.8  Ironically, a larger nationality fire would
erupt in Transylvania in 184849, despite the efforts of his son to avert it.
During young Wesselényis lifetime, Hungary and Transylvania were caught
between currents of change and historic inertia. One factor was a rapid population
growth which altered the nations demographic composition. After the Austrian
expulsion of the Ottomans from the Habsburg lands, there was a significant popu-
lation growth in both Hungary and Transylvania, much of which was due to an
influx of non-Magyars. The figures are only approximations, but in the early eight-
eenth century there may have been about eight million people living in Hungary
(including Croatia) and Transylvania. By 1850, the population in the same area
had risen to nearly fourteen million souls. While the Magyars were easily the
largest single ethnic group, comprising about forty per cent of the total inhabitants
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in the Kingdom of Hungary, there were more combined non-Magyar peoples than
there were Magyars in Hungary.9  The Romanian population constituted an abso-
lute majority in Transylvania.10
By the nineteenth century, Hungary had been touched by the Enlightenment,
the Hungarian national awakening and a Magyar language revival. But the nation
was also a product of its feudal past. While Hungary was part of the polyglot
Habsburg Empire, it viewed itself as a separate kingdom within that realm. Dur-
ing the eighteenth century the Habsburgs tried to centralize their Empire, but Hun-
gary retained considerable self-rule in its own domestic affairs.11  Hungarys feu-
dal nobility dominated the nations political, social and economic life. Approxi-
mately five per cent (perhaps 700,000) of the population was noble, although
sandaled nobles were often as poor as common folk. About 100,000 Hungar-
ians could vote, while perhaps 30,000 were permitted to take an active part in
politics.12  The bulk of the population lacked significant political or economic
power. The country was primarily agrarian with rural peasants comprising ap-
proximately eighty to ninety per cent of its peoples.13  The non-Magyar peasantry
was a concern, not simply because of its raw numbers, but because of budding
tensions between the Magyars and the nationalities.14  During the reign of Em-
peror Josef II, national consciousness increased among both Magyars and at least
some nationalities. To a degree Hungarian and Croat nationalism rose in reaction
to the Emperors reforms, while Romanian national aspirations were furthered by
them.15
Transylvania had been part of medieval Hungary from the Árpád conquest
until the Ottoman occupation of central Hungary during the sixteenth century.
When middle Hungary was controlled by the Ottomans, Transylvania became
semi-autonomous and experienced a kind of Golden Age which fostered Hungar-
ian cultural continuity. After the Ottomans were driven out of Hungary in the late
eighteenth century, and especially after the 1711 Treaty of Szatmár, Transylvania
came under direct Habsburg control.16
Wesselényi was the only Transylvanian among the early Reform Age figures
and one of the few who had lived among any of the nationalities. He entered
Transylvanian politics in 181819 and became popular by opposing the kinds of
reform he would later support. In 1818, the Empire tried to impose urbarial legis-
lation on Transylvanias nobles while bypassing the traditional county assem-
blies. Wesselényi sided with the nobility in opposing the reforms and played a
significant role in defeating them.17
A crucial factor in Wesselényis political development was his early friendship
with István Széchenyi, the Greatest Hungarian. In 1823, Wesselényi and
Széchenyi became friends with common interests and complementary strengths.18
During their travels through Europe the two decided to devote themselves to re-
viving Hungary by taking part in the nations public life.19  In 1828, each began
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writing a book, although Széchenyis Hitel (Credit)was published while Wesselényi
was still working on Balítéletekrõl. Because of their close association and famili-
arity with each others thoughts, there are similarities, even overlapping concepts,
in the two works. Of these Wesselényi wrote:
Our feelings and opinions are so largely similar and both works are
so similarly constructed that each of them could have been mine.20
The common themes caused Wesselényi both pleasure and sorrow, and for a time
he considered not finishing his book since he feared Hitel made it superfluous.21
Even before Hitel appeared, the two friends had begun to drift apart. The basic
dispute was over Hungarys relationship to Austria. Széchenyi was convinced
that Hungary should continue to work within the Empire, while Wesselényi thought
Austria was a major reason for Hungarys problems. Széchenyi wrote that while
he saw only a donkeys long ears, Wesselényi perceived devils horns behind
every act of Vienna.22  The issue came to a head in late 1831, when Széchenyi
wrote Wesselényi:
I see that our paths have branched apart ... we simply  do not travel
on the same road [anymore].23
By 1830, his lifes preparatory phase had ended, and a not yet thirty-five-year
old Miklós Wesselényi strode from the wings to the center stage of Hungarian
politics.
III. The Period of Hope
Only the liberal program can save Hungary from the consequences
of its oppression of the nationalities over the centuries. This can be
done by giving all citizens of the nation full legal rights without re-
gard to their class ranks or national differences.24
Although reforms came haltingly at first, the 1830 years ushered in a new era
for Hungary.25  During the first half of the 1830s Wesselényi enjoyed his greatest
political influence. He purchased lands in Hungary so that he could participate in
the Upper House of the Hungarian Diet and soon became a leader in the ellenzéki
or opposition group. That faction was vocal in the 1830 Diet but was unable to
pass significant reform legislation. When Wesselényi tried to put together a par-
liamentary coalition to enact a program of liberal reform legislation, he thereby
antagonized the Habsburg government in Vienna.26  In the 183236 Reform Diet,
he emerged as a major opposition leader and proposed a comprehensive social
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and political reform program. However, his efforts were crowned with only lim-
ited success. Peasants were relieved from minor burdens, but the essence of his
program was enacted only years later.27  Midway through the Diets term, Wesse-
lényi left Hungary for Transyvania to build support for liberal reform there and
the reunification of Transylvania with Hungary. When he returned in 1835, Kossuth
and Deák had assumed leadership of the opposition group.28
In his speeches, Wesselényi generally did not address the nationality question
as such. But forcible recruitment of peasant soldiers, land reform and equality
under law were issues with strong nationality overtones. He emphasized the need
for reforms, but did not advocate universal suffrage or dividing the nation along
ethnic lines. He wanted Hungary to be Magyar and nobility driven.29  If his re-
forms were adopted, he believed, an almost idyllic society would emerge, but he
warned of dangers if change did not occur.30  Much of his reform program is found
in his 183036 speeches and in Balítéletekrõl.
Perhaps the greatest speech Wesselényi ever made was his January, 1833 Sybil
speech to the Diet in which he emphasized the urgency of reform legislation. He
spoke of the mythical Sybil who appeared in antiquity with her books of wisdom.
Each time she proffered her volumes, she was rejected because her price was too
high. After each rebuff she burned three of her books. Wesselényi likened prior
Diets to the ancients who spurned the Sybil and he criticized earlier nobles for
blocking peasant reforms. The Sybil was appearing for the last time; a rejection of
her last offer would spell doom:
... Following her Christian duty, Marie Therese was ... forced to fur-
ther this cause apart from the Diet. True, she acted illegally, but did
so for the higher good of mankind, which is the highest law. It was
then that the Sybil appeared to our nation the first time offering her
nine books. But we found them too expensive, rejected them and
thus, three of her books were thrown into the flames.
In the last quarter of the previous century, Josef [II] ... [also] by an
unlawful action which still deserves blessing, abolished serfdom, this
blight on humanity. In 1790, the Empires Councils approved this
action and began consultations about relieving conditions of the peas-
antry. It was then, that the Sybil appeared a second time, offering
now her six remaining books. But we found them too expensive and
so she threw three more books in the fire leaving her with only three
books left. We should have abolished serfdom, eliminated all of its
remnants, and washed off its filth in order to save the peasantry from
the burdens of oppression and insecurity which pressed upon their
person and landholding [rooted] in serfdom; instead, we clumsily
abandoned the laudable work, referring it to committees for forty-
two years.
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Today the Sybil reappears with her last three books. We must not
allow these [last three books] to be thrown into the flames, for I de-
clare before heaven that if these burn to ashes, our homeland will be
wasted and consumed.31
The peasant question was the most important socio-political issue Wesselényis
reformers faced.32  The problem included the need to: 1) ease or abolish archaic
feudal dues and services which peasants owed landlords; 2) enact reforms so peas-
ants could own some of the land on which they worked; 3) reform or abolish the
nobles immunity from taxation and create more equitable tax burdens; and 4)
abolish serfdom. Peasant land reforms were inextricably intertwined with the na-
tionality question. The latter complicated the former, but one could not be re-
solved without the other. Nationality and peasants issues were often simply dif-
ferent sides of the same coin.33  Wesselényi feared the prospect of peasant revolt
and believed that unless the nation took prompt steps to reduce discontent, it faced
potentially dangerous consequences. He proposed to defuse the underlying causes
of peasant resentment by a gradually implemented land reform program in which
peasants would make redemption payments for the property they would acquire.
This son of the stormy petrel wanted to restructure Hungarian society by pro-
gressive, peaceful consensus rather than abrupt social upheaval.34
In 1831, Wesselényi announced that minor revisions to the robot and feudal
dues would be insufficient since peasants needed to actually own some lands on
which they worked.35  In his Sybil speech, he attacked feudal dues and an out-
moded legal system which gave landowners excessive controls over the peas-
antry. The nobles exemption from taxation was fundamentally unfair. Those who
earned the least should not have to bear the heaviest tax burden.36  In a November
10, 1833 speech in Szatmár county, he deplored landowner oppression of the peas-
antry and called for a revision of feudal laws which caused indescribable peasant
misery. Owners were being unjustly enriched by peasant payments and services,
yet the peasantry paid most of the nations taxes and supplied the bulk of its sol-
diers. He attacked an ossified legal system which allowed a small privileged mi-
nority to unjustly dominate millions of fellow citizens.37
If the peasant question were the most pressing issue Wesselényis liberals faced,
the idea of equality before the law was both the crown jewel and the Gordian knot
of their program. The basic concept was that all Hungarys citizens should stand
equally before the law, regardless of class, religion or nationality. This legal equality
required that the nobles give up some of their previously exclusive power, even
though they still would play a major role in the nations political transformation.
Hungarys progressive nobility would continue to define the Magyar nation. If
by revolution or election the nobility were supplanted, their place would most
likely be taken by non-Magyars, and Hungary would cease to be Hungarian.38  But
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legal equality was necessary for those Hungarian and non-Magyar citizens who
had previously been victimized: ... [T]he yoke of tyranny must oppress no one;
the shield of the law must protect everyone equally.39  He yearned for a Hungar-
ian national state, but if that states survival:
... could only be won at the cost of keeping millions of people de-
prived of their human and civil rights, he would rather ... bow his
head and submit the nation to the curse of annihilation.40
Wesselényi hoped that if the nation implemented constitutional reforms and full
legal equality, the nationalities would voluntarily choose to become assimilated
Magyars.41
He criticized government recruitment and impressment practices by which
military age males (often peasants) were involuntarily forced into the army.42  Such
heavy-handed actions dislocated lives and ripped apart peasant households. In an
October, 1830 speech, Wesselényi deplored the impressment practices used by the
government and detailed the economic hardship and domestic trauma they cre-
ated.43  In 1831, he boldly (and perhaps intemperately) announced that on his own
lands in Transylvania he would personally resist any governmental attempts to
draft unwilling peasants in the army.44  In January of 1833, he told the Diet that
forcing non-consenting peasants into the army constituted both landowner and
state oppression. Later that same year he informed a county assembly that feudal
privileges which allowed landlords the right to force unwilling peasants into mili-
tary service was a classic unjust dominion exercised by the few over the mil-
lions.45
But in the 1830s, Wesselényi also took positions on two issues which irritated
at least some nationalities. The first of these was his belief that Magyar, rather
than Latin, should be the official governmental language in Hungary. With his
strong support, the Reform Diet passed a law which made Hungarian the official
governmental language in certain situations. The Croats expressed their bitter
objection.46  Secondly, in the mid-1830s, Wesselényi was a major figure in an
attempt to bring about the reunification of Transylvania with Hungary. While he
proposed that reunification be conditioned upon Transylvanias Diet granting lib-
eral peasant rights and land reforms, and that any future merger had to be ap-
proved by Transylvanias Diet with royal approval, some of the nationalities were
alarmed at the prospect of a Transylvanian reunification.
Wesselényi completed Balítéletekrõl in 1831, but it was not printed until 1833
because of censorship problems and printing delays.47  As its title indicates, the
work identifies types of distorted perceptions which cause faulty decisions. Its
chapters are arranged according to kinds of prejudices people have (i.e., Mis-
judgments of Birth and Political Status, etc.). While many of Wesselényis re-
form concepts are contained in Balítéletekrõl,48  they are not specifically identi-
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fied by chapter headings, but interspersed throughout the work, often as solutions
to various kinds of muddled thinking.49
Wesselényi specifically raised the nationality question in Balítéletekrõl, although
of the books nearly three hundred pages only a few deal with it. His primary
purpose was to identify the divisive ethnic tensions which were splitting Hungary
into factions. In Balítéletekrõl, he described the problem, but also presented in
embryo basic concepts which later dominated Szózat.50  Wesselényi mused:
Imagine what we could do in Hungary if the multitude of different
national groups and religions would overcome all of these conflict-
ing view-points and petty prejudices so that all of the nations citi-
zens, regardless of nationality, could join hands to bring about unity
and a single national state by sacrificing their mutual animosities and
suspicions upon the nations altar?51
He was profoundly troubled by the ethnic contention he observed:
We have among us all kinds of languages, many religions, countless
different customs and many nationality types. And therein lies the
danger. It is difficult, if not impossible, to bridge all of these differ-
ences. Only a [single] national fervor for the homeland, the law and
the constitution can bridge these contentions by extending constitu-
tional blessings to all these disparate tongues, religions and national
groups. Only thus can we achieve the result that no one [ethnic] group
can harm or torment another.52
While Balítéletekrõl illustrates, rather than solves, the nationality problem,
Wesselényi suggested that the homeland, the law and the constitution could
create a unified nation. Constitutionalism would dominate his later Szózat, but
Balítéletekrõl presaged its theme. At a time when rising nationalism was just be-
ginning to surface, he saw the wisdom of trying to build a broad national consen-
sus in a multi-national state:
... Blessed is every effort which tries to root out the prejudices and
differences which pit one nationality against another and tries to re-
solve national separations. On the other hand, that which breeds sepa-
ration and incites national passions, even when done in jest, is detest-
able and harmful.53
Wesselényis early nationality ideas expressed the Hungarian liberal position
and exposed its basic contradictions. By the 1830s, some ethnic consciousness
had already surfaced among Hungarys nationalities. In opting for a one nation,
one language pattern borrowed from Western Europe, Wesselényi and his liber-
als may have chosen a model which would not work in multi-lingual, multi-cul-
tural Hungary. While he and the liberal reformers wanted to extend broad consti-
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tutional rights to the nationalities, the nation they intended to create was to be
Magyar centered:
On the one hand, there was implicit in their dedication to civil rights
for all an impetus to the national development of every ethnic group;
on the other, there was their determination to recognize as a nation
with collective rights no ethnic group within the country but the Hun-
garian. This, in a nutshell, was the irreconcilable internal contradic-
tion at the heart of liberal nationalism.54
In Balítéletekrõl Wesselényi also addressed the need for land and tax reform.
There were two major flaws in Hungarys constitution: 1) the lack of legal protec-
tion for the peasantry; and 2) the nobles immunity from taxation.55  Put simply
the issue was:
... As soon as possible, the nation should allow its peasants to have
title interests in lands upon which they work and to become land-
owners under uncomplicated conditions.56
Reforms needed to come about incrementally rather than by revolution, as abrupt
changes engender national instability. But they needed to begin lest the lower
economic classes become desperate.57  He proposed a uniform formula for deter-
mining how peasants should pay for land and a similar schedule for property re-
demption payments. The goal was for peasants to eventually own at least part of
the land on which they worked, freed from feudal dues and services.58  But
Wesselényis solution to the peasant problem was more than just removing eco-
nomic restraints. The nation needed to lift up its peasants, abolish conditions which
impoverished them, and repeal the feudal system which allowed nobles to exploit
peasant labor. There were deeper social factors since poverty carried within itself
destructive seeds of oppression. Servitude followed in the wake of poverty, enfee-
bling the soul and weakening the state. But economic freedom would provide an
opportunity for secure financial life and mental development.59
The other major economic problem was the nobles immunity from taxation.
Wesselényi boldly announced: I say publicly that we, the Hungarian nobility,
must pay taxes. While some imagined that freedom required nobles to be exempt
from taxation, those with the highest incomes and abilities also needed to make
financial contributions toward the national good. Every citizen had the obligation
to pay taxes; each was also entitled to develop its wealth without stifling feudal
burdens.60
Balítéletekrõl echoed Wesselényis basic theme that all Hungarians should be
equal under law. Sometimes he addressed the equality issue indirectly while criti-
cizing prejudices grounded in pedigree (kutyabõr) or wealth which denied civic
equality to those not nobly born.61  Depriving a person of basic legal rights was
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tyranny because all were entitled to a fair reward for their honest labor. To the
oppressed he wrote:
... Peasant, dry thy tears! In the stirrings of the nations noblest hearts
the dawn is breaking. The time is here and the age is now when the
law offers you a fate worthy of your human existence and merit.62
The greatest freedom existed where the interests of all were guarded by prop-
erly appointed representatives. But reforms which existed only on paper would
not suffice:
... Standing alone, neither statutes, constitutions nor favorable politi-
cal conditions enrich a nation. Unless as a result of inner develop-
ment and progress a legislative program is given life, the wisest law
will remain a dead letter; the strongest government will simply die a
painful death. Public order and constitutions do not always produce a
national spirit. Rather, spiritual and moral progress is that which in-
exorably carries good laws along with it ...63
Although at times it is critical of the status quo, Balítéletekrõls message is
optimistic. There were serious problems in Hungarian society, but Wesselényi
was confident of his remedy. If the nation would make the needed changes, Hun-
gary could have land reforms which provided security for both peasants and land-
lords, equality of the nationalities under law, more equitable taxation, credit re-
forms to stimulate the nations economic growth, the abolition of feudalism, a
constitution which guaranteed human rights, and freedom of the press.64  Reality
was different, but when Wesselényi finished his book, he was hopeful that Hun-
gary stood at the threshold of a new age.
In 1835 and 1836, criminal actions were filed against Wesselényi in Transylvania
and Hungary. Metternich saw him as a dangerous radical who needed to be heeled.65
The government claimed that in November, 1833, and December, 1834 (both in
legislative sessions), Wesselényi made treasonous speeches.66  The specter of the
trials haunted him and undermined his health. On October 18, 1837, Széchenyi
wrote that he had met with Wesselényi and that ... the poor devil looks as if he
had already spent ten years in prison.67  In March, 1838, while awaiting his trial
verdict, Wesselényi was in Pest when a massive Danube flood inundated the city
and destroyed almost half of its houses. He requisitioned a boat and spent the next
72 hours rescuing trapped souls and rowing them to safety, personally saving
some six hundred people from a watery grave. In February, 1839, Wesselényi was
sentenced to serve three years in prison. During that imprisonment, first in Buda,
then in Gräfenberg, Bohemia, he began to go blind. After serving less than a year
in prison he was pardoned, but never again regained his earlier political influence.
At Gräfenberg he was treated to save his failing eyesight, but by 1844, he was
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almost completely blind.68  Wesselényis Era of Hope ended with imprisonment
and blindness. His parliamentary achievements were mostly symbolic, but if his
dream of the 1830s was not attained then, neither did it die. Although he was no
longer a major political figure, a number of his reform ideas were adopted in
1848.
IV. The Period of Anxiety
... I tell you that now is the midnight hour of danger. And I will tell
you the cause of the danger. The threat has ripened, and for that rea-
son Europe needs to be on guard. The Northern Giant [Russia] threat-
ens both present and future conditions which weigh heavily upon
Europe. And I shall tell you, and particularly our homeland, what
that danger is and what must be done to withstand the threatening
peril.69
Increasingly engulfed in a world darkened by blindness, politically emascu-
lated and largely forgotten in Hungary, Wesselényi began the 1840s broken and
enfeebled. But soon he began to focus on the nationality topic which would domi-
nate his lifes last decade. Gräfenberg spa attracted notable people from all around
as Germans, Czechs, Poles, South Slavs, Romanians, Russians and Western Euro-
peans gathered to take the waters. Because of his imprisonment and health
Wesselényis actions were somewhat limited, but he could still talk to people. He
joined the casino at Gräfenberg and met intellectuals from other Central European
nations who discussed with him the Slavic awakening and its potential meaning
for Europe. He paid particular attention to their observations about Hungary and
its non-Magyar peoples. At Gräfenberg many of his Szózat ideas ripened, en-
riched by the thoughts of those with whom he shared ideas.70
After 1836, Kossuth and others advocated a more aggressive agenda with re-
spect to both the nationalities and Austria. The focal issue of whether Magyar
should become Hungarys official language widened the gap between Magyars
and some nationalities.71  Efforts to assimilate Hungarys ethnic groups intensi-
fied, but a number of Slavs and Romanians were awakening to their own ethnic
consciousness. By the time serious Magyarization actually began, some nation-
alities were strong enough to resist.72
After his release from prison Wesselényi wrote a December 8, 1842 newspaper
article in Pesti Hírlap in which he attacked Széchenyis earlier speech on the
nationality issue at the Magyar Tudományos Akadémia. Széchenyis speech criti-
cized Kossuth and Pulszky and claimed that their chauvinist attempts to assimi-
late the nationalities had damaged Hungarys reputation abroad and hardened non-
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Magyar opposition at home.73  He implied that the Slav nationality movements
had arisen as a reaction to these heavy-handed Magyarization and language
efforts. Wesselényi responded hotly:
... I declare that this [Széchenyis] statement that the Slavic move-
ment is a reaction caused by excessive Hungarian language zeal is
without foundation ... and these false statements make us hated at
home and abroad ... Besides that, the Slav movement threatens both
our homeland and all of Europe with grave danger ...
... I deny that Hungarians who cherish the spirit of constitutional
freedom would tolerate or could tolerate persecution or hatred of the
Slavs by any overzealous efforts. And I firmly state that those who
try to stir up our nation by acts of force or oppression against for-
eigners or other nationalities violate the dictates of law and reason.
But in the same vein, those who would work against the Hungarian
language and people or who knowingly or unknowingly promote
movements contrary to our nation, are enemies of our most sacred
interests.74
Despite Wesselényis florid language, there were substantial similarities in the
positions of the two former friends. They did disagree about what caused the rise
of the Slavic movements, but they acknowledged that the failure to timely extend
civil rights to nationalities had created a major problem. Each admitted that a
policy of overzealous Magyarization was ethically and logically wrong. They both
conceded that the Slavs had legitimate grievances and suggested the need for cau-
tion and patience in dealing with them and that a too vigorous attempt at assimila-
tion would not succeed.
Wesselényi began to write Szózat in early 1841, but ill health and poor vision
slowed his efforts. Despite his growing blindness, Wesselényi finished the book
in 1843 and sent it to the printer in Leipzig where it was published later that
year.75
Szózat begins with Wesselényi calling himself civically dead, an outcast cut
off from the circle of active politics. He had been one of his nations brightest
lights, but because of illness he could no longer play that role.76  But notwithstand-
ing his physical afflictions he must try to awaken his country to the danger which
threatens it:
... For out of the grave the spectral voice sounds the alarm. Danger
threatens, Oh Homeland! Danger such as there has never been be-
fore.77
He called upon the nation to awaken and heed the impending threat or it would
perish. Wesselényi believed the root cause of the nationality problem was the
Magyar nobilitys failure to allow nationalities the right to participate in Hunga-
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rys political system. For nearly a millennium the Hungarian ruling class had failed
to allow the nations non-Magyars any significant voice in government or soci-
ety.78  Centuries of shortsighted exclusion by the Magyar aristocracy had oppressed
the nationalities and made them resentful. As a result, the countrys non-Magyars
had become estranged and Hungary was a powder keg ready to explode. The
nations situation might have been totally different had the conquering Árpáds not
treated the non-Magyars as merely subject peoples. How much wiser it would
have been to grant them full Hungarian citizenship.79  Instead, a few hundred thou-
sand privileged people held total political power while many millions lacked ba-
sic civic protections. But the ruling elite had also made paupers of Hungarians
who were not nobles. As a result, the non-Magyars and most ethnic Hungarians
were excluded from government and deprived of constitutional rights.80  The con-
sequence of this narrow-minded elitism was a legacy of bitterness. But in the
nineteenth century new forces had arisen, partly as an outgrowth of the French
Revolution, including yearnings for constitutionalism and greater political free-
dom. These feelings fostered ethnic consciousness and aspirations for self-deter-
mination.81  Powerful external propaganda forces had stirred these yearnings, all
of which presaged disaster for Hungary and the Habsburg Empire unless past
mistakes were rectified.
Wesselényi was among the first to sense a danger in the growing discontent
among Hungarys nationalities. Some scholars have questioned his premise that
the root cause of nationality unrest in mid-nineteenth century Hungary was the
Árpád conquerors failure to grant citizenship to the conquered peoples nearly a
millennium earlier.82  At the time of the Conquest, Magyar society was tribal, rather
than feudal. It would have been unusual for any European people in the tenth
century to offer full civic rights to peoples they had just vanquished. Wesselényi
may have overlooked the reality that Hungarian society had permitted some non-
Magyar membership in the nations nobility. A survey dated near the time
Wesselényi wrote Szózat suggested that perhaps fifteen per cent of the nations
nobility was non-Magyar and did not speak Hungarian.83  However, the crucial
factor is not whether the nationality estrangement had its roots in early Árpád
times or later ones, but Wesselényis observation that the nationalities (and Magyar
non-nobles) had long been systematically excluded from participation in the na-
tions political process and deprived of legal protections in Hungarian society.
One may question Wesselényis postulates, but he accurately concluded that an
unresolved nationality problem posed an increasingly serious danger for multi-
national Hungary.
A major Wesselényi purpose in writing Szózat was to expose what he saw as a
Russian attempt to manipulate the Pan-Slav and Illyrian movements in order to
weaken Slavic ties to Hungary and Austria.84  He reiterated his Balítéletekrõl opin-
ion that Slavs distrusted each other because of their conflicting national aspira-
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tions and traditions.85  Because of past injustices suffered by Slavs and Romani-
ans, Wesselényi was convinced they held strong negative feelings toward Austria
and Hungary. He felt that because of their similar Slavic languages and cultural
heritages the Hungarian Slavs looked to Russia as a more likely protector of their
nationality aspirations than either Austria or Hungary.86  As Ottoman power waned
in Southeastern Europe, he feared Russia would fill the resulting vacuum with the
help of the South Slavs. This expansion into the South Slav regions posed a dire
threat to both the Empire and to Hungary.87
Wesselényi believed there were two kinds of Slav propaganda which under-
mined South Slav loyalty to Hungary: 1) Russian (by far the most dangerous); and
2) Western Slav (mostly Polish) which advocated the creation of several inde-
pendent Slavic states in Central Europe. In the end, both would inure to Russias
benefit.88  He feared Russia would either swallow whole the smaller Slavic peo-
ples, thereby making them part of a Greater Russia; or that it would fashion a
weak assemblage of Slavic puppet nations. Such politically non-viable mini-states
would be inescapably drawn into the Russian orbit because they could not inde-
pendently survive without Russias protection. He believed Russia was the black-
hatted villain whose propaganda aimed at weakening multi-national states with
large Slavic populations (such as Austria and Hungary). At the same time, the tsar
tried to solidify pro-Russian feeling among Slavs prior to the outbreak of what
Wesselényi felt would be an inevitable great war between Austria and Russia.89
The Russian danger was serious for all Europe, but absolutely life-threatening to
status-quo nations such as Austria and Hungary with large Slavic minorities.90
Wesselényi has been criticized for his belief that 1840s Russia was the power
behind the Pan-Slavic and Illyrian movements.91  For all the emphasis he placed
upon the Russian danger, Szózats author gives few specific instances of Russian
propaganda efforts involving the Western Slavs.92  Non-Hungarian scholars of both
Pan-Slavism and Illyrianism have suggested that there was little active Russian
involvement in either movement during the 183050 period.93  While Wesselényi
correctly sensed there would be a future Russian threat to Hungary, the Russian
action which undercut Hungarys 184849 Revolution was not the Great North-
ern Powers intervention in support of Hungarys Slavs but its fraternal assistance
to its then ally, Austria. During Wesselényis lifetime Hungarys struggle was
primarily directed at Austria, not its nationalities (although Transylvanias Roma-
nians, the Croats and Serbs fought against Hungary in 184849).
Of the nationalities treated in Szózat, Wesselényis views about the Transylvanian
Romanians were the most faulty in their short-term perceptions yet most accurate
for the future. His thoughts meandered through three difficult to reconcile themes:
1) a similar Uniate-Orthodox cultural and linguistic tradition; 2) a Romanian-
Russian cultural connection; and 3) a Transylvanian Romanian affinity toward
Moldavia and Wallachia which he feared would lead to the eventual creation of a
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Greater Romania. While his theories were not always consistent, he may have
been the first Hungarian to see the possibility of a potential Romanian threat to
Hungary.94
Wesselényi believed that Transylvanias Romanians, both Uniate and Ortho-
dox, had similar traditions which united them in the face of persecution by those
who neither understood them nor shared their beliefs. He wrote of the Romanians
... common suffering and mutually oppressive fate which increased their own
national feelings.95  He also conceded that Transylvanias Romanians had cause
for anti-Magyar bitterness and that they might already be irretrievably alienated
from Hungary. Hinting at the theme of his 1848 Klauzál letter, Wesselényi ques-
tioned the loyalty of Transylvanias Romanians to Hungary. He also thought that
the Romanians in Hungary had strong cultural ties to Russia on account of their
similar eastern orthodox faiths. If a future war were to break out between Russia
and Austria, he believed the Romanians would likely side with Russia because of
their common religious beliefs.96  Wesselényis most intriguing observation was
his concern that in some future time, the Transylvanian Romanians would join
with Wallachia and Moldavia in forming a Greater Romania.97
Wesselényis Romanian observations have evoked negative scholarly comment.
Trócsányi notes that Szózat only hints at the historic oppression of the Transylvanian
Romanians by the Hungarian nobility and the consistent exclusion of Romanians
from Transylvanian politics.98  Others assert that Wesselényi misperceived
Transylvanian-Romanian aspirations of the time and overestimated the danger of
a Russo-Romanian alliance grounded upon an orthodox faith orientation.99  While
one modern scholar claims that Wesselényi based his opinion on ethnicity and
geography, rather than on facts,100  Wesselényis fear of a Greater Romania and its
grave implications for Hungary became reality after the 1919 Treaty of Trianon.
Some of his Romanian perceptions were flawed, but in light of later developments
Wesselényi should be given credit for observing what were perhaps the first stages
of later powerful trends.
To counteract the Russian propaganda Wesselényi returned to his Balítéletekrõl
ideas of constitutionalism. He was convinced that the infallible tools which would
win over the nationalities to Hungary were guaranteed constitutional rights and
full equality before the law. If Hungary would give her non-Magyars these politi-
cal freedoms, they would see they had more to gain by staying in the Empire than
by allying with Russia. Thus, Russian influence over the South Slavs would cease.101
The task was to convince the Slavs that Hungary would not deprive them of their
national languages or traditions, but would accept them as full participatory mem-
bers in a new Hungarian society in which ancient prejudices were replaced by
constitutionalism and mutual respect.102
Wesselényi pled for a more humane, equitable Hungary. If part of a nations
people is oppressed, that nation will not be great even if a dominant group has a
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strong national consciousness. Those who would subordinate or sacrifice nation-
ality rights in the name of state interests, merely play into the hands of the Slav or
Illyrian movements.103
Perhaps Szózats most controversial feature was its proposal that the Habsburg
Empire be transformed into a constitutional confederation which would consist of
five governmental units all loosely bound to the Habsburg monarch, but with
rather broad local autonomy.104  Wesselényi believed this reconfiguration would
counteract Russian threats and honor nationality aspirations.105  Under his plan the
Austrian section of the Empire would be split in four parts, while the Hungarian
portion would be expanded by adding Transylvania. The South Slavs, Slovaks
and Romanians would stay in Hungary rather than form separate administrative
units of their own. Even a brief glimpse of this plan discloses two major problems:
1) Austria would almost surely have had significant reservations about being carved
in pieces while Hungary not only remained intact, but expanded; and 2) the Serbs,
Croats and Romanians would likely have strongly objected to staying in Hungary
while other nationality groups were given autonomy.
Nonetheless, Wesselényi assumed that if the Empire were reconstructed into
the five federative components, peoples who had historically opposed each other
would become allies, thus decreasing ethnic tensions.106  The Empire would be-
come a symbol of freedom instead of reaction and would also strengthen itself for
a later battle with Russia. While Russia might attempt to evoke vague notions of
Slavic kinship, she could not offer the Slavs constitutional protections or a mean-
ingful role in its government.107
From todays perspective, Wesselényis proposed solutions to the nationality
problem seem rather utopian in light of what happened afterward. His confedera-
tion idea was almost surely impractical and had no real chance of adoption. The
linchpin of Szózat, that constitutionalism would have stronger appeal to the non-
Magyars than Slavic or Romanian nationalism, was almost surely erroneous. With
remarkable incisiveness, Professor Varga observes:
... [A] number of Hungarys ethnic groups already had a national
consciousness strong enough for their leaders to have set their sights
on building their own nations, and these same men were hardly likely
to consider national rights an acceptable price to pay for civil liberty.
In fact, their reaction to the idea of constitutional Magyarization
and to attempts to spread the use of the Hungarian language left no
doubt that the proposed liberties were hardly attractive enough for
them to subscribe to the one nation principle. As Károly Nagy
aptly noted, equal rights would not engender jubilant ethnic groups
rushing to assimilate to the Hungarians.108
One other Szózat point is worth noting. Wesselényi perceived that Hungary
was geographically vulnerable because she was surrounded by Slavs and Roma-
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nians who he felt would be probable Russian allies if war came.109  The nation was
surrounded by ethnic groups and the nationalities held the high ground which
encircled the country. When the Magyars came into Hungary, they had settled on
the fertile plains, leaving the mountainous, agriculturally less productive areas to
the nationalities. From a military point of view these mountains were of obvious
strategic advantage.110  If a Romanian or Slav invasion of Hungary occurred, he
worried that the invaders might form states or confederations which would be
built on the ruins of historic Hungary. All or part of Hungary would then be ruled
by enemies who would either destroy the nation or create new states out of what
had been old Hungary. The Magyars would be confined to a truncated part of
central Hungary which would be reduced to a minor power.111  Wesselényi also
saw a cloudy future for Austria. With haunting acuity he wrote:
... Austrias existence can be maintained best by peace; war,even a
victorious war, may well result in her annihilation.112
Szózat certainly has weaknesses in both its analysis of the nationality problem
and in its proposed solutions. But while fairness requires that we disclose its faults,
we should also acknowledge its strengths. Wesselényi observed that his own aris-
tocratic class had drawn the circle of political participation too tightly, particu-
larly in an age of the French Revolution and national consciousness. The sins of
the fathers could be visited upon the sons unless changes were made in the way
Hungary treated its non-Magyar nationalities. Wesselényis flaws in short-term
vision have already been noted, but he accurately foresaw the direction in which
nationality movements were headed and the dangers these movements posed to
Hungary if a solution were not found to the nationality problem. He sensed that
Russia would try to expand its influence into the Balkans, and that it would justify
its actions by claiming to be the protector of the Slavs. He saw Hungarys vulner-
ability in the event of a major European war and feared that the minorities would
try to create national states out of historic Hungary, leaving the Magyars confined
to middle Hungary. Szózat raised issues which were central to Hungarys survival
as a multi-national state, but in 1843, no one wanted to listen to a civically dead
blind man who called for moderation in an age of rising nationalism.
V. The Period of Reality
The lack of interest in Szózat was a tremendous disappointment for Wesselényi.
However, when the March 1848 Revolution broke out in Hungary, he was given a
brief new political life and again became active in Transylvanian politics. On
April 12, 1848, he warned Hungarys Transylvanians that the Romanian peasants
there would react angrily unless feudal laws were abolished and land reforms
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enacted. Otherwise he feared that the Romanians in Transylvania would join
Moldavia and Wallachia and try to create a new Romanian state which would
include at least part of Transylvania.113  On June 6, 1848, he addressed
Transylvanias Diet which had abolished some of the relics of feudalism. Wesselényi
recalled the lives of those who had suffered under laws which impoverished those
who worked and enriched those who did not. He concluded:
... My prayer is this. That we raise up to ourselves those who have
suffered so much already. Let us raise them to where God created
them. Let Transylvanias peasants and serfs no longer be the op-
pressed, the people of the dust, the misera plebs, but rather let them
be free citizens. Let them be equal with us in responsibility and may
they be constitutionally empowered fellow citizens who stand equally
before the law; let them have the same legal rights and common
freedoms that we do, and thus serve their homeland and be called our
brothers in defending her.114
But the Romanians, who originally supported the revolution, began to turn away,
at least partly because of an unwillingness of Hungarys leaders to negotiate with
them.115  Almost immediately after the Austrian government agreed to Hungarys
1848 proposals for internal self-rule, the Croats became hostile. By the late spring
of 1848, Croatias Ban, Josip Jellacih, assembled South Slav forces to invade
Hungary. On April 20, 1848, Wesselényi wrote Hungarys new Prime Minister,
Lajos Batthyány, to share his concern that if war broke out between Croatia and
Hungary, Russia might become involved.116  Wesselényi emphasized the need to
keep the conflict contained and that if the price for peace was greater Croatian
autonomy, Hungary should cut its losses:
... I think we must avoid everything that might serve the Ban [Jellacih]
and his Croats as an excuse to openly declare their secession and
carry it through. We cannot keep Croatia for our own; lets give up
all efforts to do so, which can bring no benefit, but can result in
harm.
... Lets make an agreement with the Croats, one that recognizes
them, and guarantees their independence, but guarantees also our
trade and gives us joint ownership of a piece of coastline.117
His letter to Batthyány suggests Wesselényi recognized that his Szózat idea of
constitutionalism would no longer work with the Croats. Whatever earlier oppor-
tunity there might have been to retain Croatia had been lost. And rather than jeop-
ardize Hungarys political existence, he was prepared to allow Croatia to go its
separate way.
Wesselényi was also concerned about events in Transylvania. On June18, 1848,
he wrote Gábor Klauzál, the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, Industry and
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Trade,118  that there were many ethnic Magyars living among Slovaks, Romani-
ans, and Serbs who were needed as citizens of Hungary. There were also large
numbers of Romanians in Transylvania and Hungary. If they wished, these Roma-
nians could join with their Moldavian and Wallachian cousins in those areas of
Transylvania where Romanians comprised a majority of the population.119  To re-
solve existing tensions Wesselényi proposed that Transylvania be peacefully par-
titioned along nationality lines, thus creating a Romanian Transylvania which would
join with Wallachia and Moldavia, and a territorially smaller, but ethnically ho-
mogenous Hungarian Transylvania to be united with Hungary. The part of
Transylvania which would belong to Hungary would consist of people who either
considered themselves Hungarian or who wanted to be citizens of the Hungarian
state. He assumed that the majority of Romanians in Transylvania would want to
leave Hungary and become part of a new Romania.120  The consequence of more
than a half-million Hungarians being submerged into a Romanian state could be
avoided by this peaceful, voluntary partition.121
Wesselényi envisioned a consensual relocation and exchange of peoples in which
Hungarians living in Transylvanian areas where Romanians predominated could
trade homes and properties with Romanians ... who lived close to lands inhabited
by Hungarians. He optimistically assumed that Transylvanias Szekelers and
Germans would join the new Hungarian Transylvania.122  He was confident that
this:
... unprecedented, but not impossible ... migration of peoples ...
[should] be realized through peaceful discussions in keeping with
the culture and spirit of the present age.123
In conjunction with this transfer of peoples there could also be an adjustment of
the political borders of Romanian and Hungarian Transylvania which would re-
flect the changes caused by these voluntary migrations.124
Wesselényis ideas in the Klauzál letter seem to reflect his begrudging recogni-
tion that Romanian nationalism was a stronger force than constitutionalism or
equality under the law. Klauzál did not respond to Wesselényis letter. Hungary
was plunging headlong into a military conflict which threatened its existence, so
there was no chance in 184849 to seriously consider, let alone implement,
Wesselényis partition proposal.
In a final attempt to keep all of Transylvania within Hungary and pacify the
Romanians there, on August 17, 1848, Wesselényi introduced a nationality bill in
the Transylvanian Diet. On August 25, he spoke before the Upper House noting
that the situation he had warned about in Szózat had become a horrible reality. In
order to ease Romanian distrust, his nationality bill would show the Diets good
faith and grant full citizenship plus constitutional, religious and language protec-
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tions to Transylvanias Romanians.125  He told the Diet that passage of his bill was
urgent:
... because I am convinced that this bill at the present moment is as
crucial as it is useful ... I know that this bill will achieve what is vital
for the interests of our homeland and the preservation of our nation,
namely harmony and peace [in Transylvania].126
Wesselényis nationality bill was approved by Transylvanias Lower, but rejected
by the Upper House.127  Thereafter, the situation in Transylvania took a bloody
turn as many Romanians sided with Austria and took up arms against the Hungar-
ians there.
With Hungary facing an imminent Austrian invasion, Wesselényi left his home
in Transylvania and took his family to Gräfenberg. When the revolt collapsed in
1849, a gravely ill Wesselényi returned to Hungary, intending to die at Zsibó. On
his journey home aboard a steamer, he contracted pneumonia and died in Pest on
April 21, 1850.128
VI. Conclusion
Perhaps the final question is simply: What is there about Wesselényis life
that merits our attention a century and a half after his death? He was not the
scholar Eötvös was, not as effective a negotiator as Deák, not as attuned to the
countrys mood as was Kossuth, nor as brilliant a writer as Széchenyi. The latter
spoke with some truth when he noted that Wesselényi continually tried to swim
upstream.129  But his stubbornness was often born of a remarkably refined ideal-
ism. While one finds instances of his own class consciousness in his writings and
speeches, more often his dominant concern was what would benefit the nation.
Unlike Dessewffy, or perhaps even Kossuth, Wesselényi was more than a spokes-
man for his social class. And therein lies something enduring. There is statesman-
ship when a member of a privileged elite asks his group to voluntarily surrender
some of its advantage for the overall good of the country. There is wisdom when
a human tries not just to defend his own position, but listens to his opponents
argument in an attempt to find a mutually acceptable compromise.
Some of Wesselényis writings and speeches reveal a far-seeing intellect. His
Sybil speech and his June, 1848 speech on the abolition of serfdom in Transylvania
are true masterpieces worthy of any nations canon of great political oratory.
Balítéletekrõls even-handed analysis of land reforms and its eloquent admonition
for legal equality reveal a man who looked beyond the narrow interests of his own
social heritage. Szózat describes the unhappy consequences of an unresolved na-
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tionality conflict and contains a chilling portrait of a nation divided against itself.
Amidst his dark fears, quantum leaps and premature calls for a confederation, one
also finds a first-rate understanding of imploded nationalisms potentially destruc-
tive power and the challenge it poses to a multi-national states social stability, if
not to its very existence.
It might be intriguing to ponder whether timely adoption of his ideas could
have altered subsequent Hungarian history. But prognostication is an extremely
slippery subject with a dizzying array of variables. And when one must factor in
the horrendous influence of World War I and the myopia of the post-war Western
Powers, any opinion may be so fraught with hazard as to be worthless. An Ameri-
can-Hungarian historian suggests that by 1848, it would have been extremely
difficult to establish a permanent integration of the nationalities within the Em-
pire and impossible thereafter.130  If that analysis is correct, Wesselényis ideas
may have come too late in any event.
This much seems certain. Wesselényi had a vision for a more humane Hungary.
In the end, his inability to persuade his nation to adopt a more balanced nationality
policy failed, not so much because of his lack of political adroitness, but because
he was ahead of his time. He endured ridicule, imprisonment, blindness, and per-
haps most painful, being ignored. The depth of his convictions are perhaps best
shown in 1848, when this frail, blind, and forgotten museum object again charged
into a battle for tolerance in his beloved Transylvania. Perhaps he deserves to be
judged not just by achievements alone, but also by his struggles, by what he tried
to do. Mankinds struggle to raise itself is a common theme in Hungarian litera-
ture. In the winter of 185960, another Hungarian whose life was also rent by the
failed 184849 Revolution, wrote these words which he gave to a hero in his
dramatic poem:
Its not ... fool illusions [that] drive me on.
A hundred times Ill miss the goal, I know.
No matter. Truth to tell, what is a goal?
[It is] the termination of a glorious fight.
... Life is struggle, strife,
And it is [striving] itself that is mans goal.131
While Wesselényis life ended in disappointment and darkness, his silent hand
can be sensed not just in the 1848 April Laws, some of which survived the revolu-
tion, but in important legislation in 1868,132  and in Article 68 of a free and demo-
cratic Hungarys present constitution.133  Perhaps the most precious seeds are those
which require time to germinate and sprout. Wesselényis political legacy may
have been overshadowed, but some of it remains today in the laws and life of the
land he loved.
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